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Public utility markets in the United States are commonly
subject to both price and entry regulation. However, as dissatisfac-
tion with much of the nation's regulatory system has mounted
within the last decade, the wisdom of protecting utilities from
competitors has come increasingly under attack.' Numerous court
cases and administrative rulings by regulatory agencies, 2 as well
as developments in the economics literature,' have pointed to the
benefits of allowing existing buyers of a utility's services to
"bypass" the utility and transact for the services with either
incumbent firms or new entrants.4 The issue of entry deregulation
has been at the heart of debates over regulatory reform in such
industries as telecommunications,5 cable and satellite television
transmission," the postal service,7 and electricity generation. 8
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The bypass issue recently has come to the fore in the natural
gas industry. Legislative changes mandated by the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978 (the NGPA)9 and administrative reforms taken
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)0 have
fundamentally transformed the way in which the wellhead and
pipeline segments of the industry are regulated. 1 These actions
have created pressure to change the industry downstream at the
level of the local distribution company (LDC). Large industrial
customers served by LDCs are increasingly seeking ways, previ-
ously forbidden or drastically constrained, to buy cheaper gas
either directly from trunk system supplies of nearby interstate
pipelines or directly from producers. In the latter case, the gas
is transported to the end-user via pipeline "contract carriage."' 2
9. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3352 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1982)).
10. See, e.g., Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol,
FERC Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 157,
250, 284, 375, 381) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 436]; Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines
after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, FERC Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 284) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 500].
11. The natural gas industry comprises three major segments: (1) the wellhead or
production segment, in which natural gas is extracted from the ground (often as a
joint-product with petroleum) and then sold by producers to pipeline companies; (2) the
pipeline segment, dominated by interstate pipeline companies that transport the gas over
long distance "trunk" pipelines to the "city gate" and then re-sell it to local distribution
companies and large industrial direct end-users; and (3) the local distribution segment, in
which utility companies distribute the gas locally and resell it to industrial, smaller
commercial, and residential customers. The rates charged by both interstate pipeline
companies and LDCs for the gas supplies and transportation services that they sell are
regulated. In general, both types of firm are also subject to entry and exit regulation. Firms
seeking entry must obtain a "certificate of convenience and necessity." Those seeking exit
must be granted permission for "abandonment." Finally, both are typically awarded
exdusive territorial franchises that carry with them various types of "service obligations"
that must be fulfilled. For an overview of these issues and the recent policy changes that
have taken place in the gas industry, see Broadman, Natural Gas Deregulation: The Need
for Further Reform, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIs & MOMT. 496, 496-99 (1986).
12. Historically, interstate pipeline companies have mainly operated as "private
carriers," taking title to and reselling the gas that they transport. Recently, pipeline
companies have increasingly operated as "contract carriers," serving not as merchants of
gas supplies, but rather selling transport services to parties who have arranged to purchase
gas directly from producers. Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch. 556, § 7, 52 Stat. 821,
824-25 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1982)) (the NGA), pipelines that operate
as private carriers generally have the discretion to decide to whom they will provide service.
Also, the NGA authorizes the pipelines to decide the relative extent to which they will
engage in private carriage or contract carriage. Thus, unlike most other transportation
industries, natural gas pipeline companies are not statutorily subject to the rules of
"common carriage" that would obligate them to serve all customers who request service.
LDCs also have operated mainly in the private carriage mode, and they, too, are
increasingly offering contract carriage service. For more discussion, see Broadman,
Montgomery & Russell, Field Price Deregulation and the Carrier Status of Natural Gas
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Interstate pipeline companies burdened by excess "deliverability"
of gas supplies are seeking new downstream customers, especially
large industrial end-users.'" These pressures challenge the
traditional control of downstream gas markets by LDCs.
The argument over bypass of LDCs has been spirited, pitting
bypassing industrial end-users against "captive" residential
customers. 4 The debate has also raised the difficult issue of the
appropriate boundary between federal and state regulatory
authority. Perhaps most important, it has prompted a fundamen-
tal reassessment of the role of LDG service obligations and other
elements of the traditional arrangement between LDCs and public
utilities commissions (PUCs). Natural gas bypass policy is now
being determined through high-stakes court cases,'5 state legisla-
tion, 1 politicized PUG decisions," and heated arguments before
FERG commissioners and administrative law judges.'
This Article provides an analysis of the issues surrounding
bypass in local natural gas distribution markets. Its ultimate
objective is to develop a conceptual framework for analyzing both
the extent of natural monopoly in these markets and the
desirability of institutionally protecting LDGs from competitive
entry. Part I describes relevant institutional developments in the
gas industry. These include regulatory and legislative changes that
have increased the incidence of proposals for and, in some cases,
the consummation of bypass. Part II reviews the involvement of
state legislatures, state and federal regulatory bodies, and the
courts in the development of natural gas bypass policy. Part III
develops a conceptual framework for analyzing whether natural
monopolies exist in these markets and whether protecting LDCs
from competitive entry is worthwhile. Part IV provides a taxon-
omy of the costs and benefits of permitting bypass. This Article
concludes with a discussion of the principal lessons for policy-
making. Our conclusions mirror the recent developments in the
Pipelines, 6 ENERGY J. 127 (1985).
13. See Kalt & Schuller, Introduction: Natural Gas Policy in Turmoil, in DRAWING TIlE
LINE ON NATUR.m. GAs RF.GUiAIION: Timi HARVARD STUDV ON TlE FtURE OF NATURAL GAs 1 (J.
Kalt & F. Schuller eds. 1987) [hereinafter DRAWING THE LINK].
14. For a sample of the controversy, see Blaydon, State Policies Under Pressure, in
DRAWING TrlE LINE, supra note 13, at 157; Johnston & Sullins, Comments on Blaydon, in
DRAwING TnIE LINE, supra note 13, at 170; Stewart, Natural Gas on a Frontier of New
Challenges, PUB. U'IL. FORt., May 14, 1987, at 9, 13.
15. See infra notes 35-39, 58-60 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text.
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economics literature concerning the wisdom of regulation. 9 While
there are theoretical circumstances under which bypass in certain
types of naturally monopolistic industries can be inefficient, there
is less need for the current scope of entry restrictions in local
natural gas distribution markets than is commonly practiced.
I. The Incentives and Constraints That Shape Bypass
Modern regulatory reform of natural gas markets began in
1978 with gradual wellhead price deregulation under the NGPA.
Since then, reform has been working its way steadily downstream.
The phenomenon of LDC bypass stems most directly from major
modifications in federal interstate pipeline regulation introduced
in October 1985 under FERC Order 436.0 FERC Order 500,
which was issued in August 1987, also directly affects the
prospects for LDC bypass.
Order 436 gives pipeline customers potentially greater access
to contract carriage service on the interstate trunk system."
Customers served by a pipeline that receives blanket authorization
to become a "nondiscriminatory contract carrier" or an "open
access carrier" under Order 436 also receive a greater opportu-
nity to purchase gas in the open, spot market or directly from
gas producers.3 To the extent that these direct transactions
provide end-users with lower costs or delivery under more
reliable terms, they create incentives for customers to bypass the
merchant function of the LDC.
In general, three factors create the incentive for bypass of
LDCs. First, an LDC may be saddled with relatively expensive
contracts with its pipeline-suppliers, resulting in an overall level
of rates that is not competitive with either other gas sources or
19. See Bailey & Baumol, supra note 1.
20. FERC Order No. 436, supra note 10. For a detailed description and critique, see
Broadman, Deregulating Entry and Access to Pipelines, in Di.kwINo THE LNE, supra note 13,
at 125.
21. FERC Order No. 500, supra note 10. See generally WAns!. LerrER, Aug. 14, 1987
(newsletter of the Am. Gas Ass'n, Arlington, Va).
22. FERC Order No. 436, supra note 10, at 42,409-10, 42,424-26.
23. Rather than requiring a pipeline to obtain permission from FERC for contract
carriage on a case-by-case basis--the traditional route followed to engage in such
service-Order 436 allows a pipeline company to get blanket, or pre-approved, authorization
to operate as a contract carrier. One stipulation of receiving this blanket authority is that
if the pipeline company offers contract carriage service to one party, it must offer such
service to all parties; that is, it must operate as a "nondiscriminatory contract carrier" or
"open access carrier." Id. at 42,424-25.
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alternative fuels."4 Second, an LDC's rate design or structure may
be economically inefficient. Relatively high rates may be charged
to large industrial customers, which often have elastic, "interrupt-
ible" demand, while relatively low rates are charged to residential
and small commercial customers, which typically have inelastic,
"firm" demand." Finally, an LDC may not offer the type of
service that its end-users desire. For example, some large
industrial customers require firm private carriage distribution
service, but their LDC suppliers do not offer it to them.26 More
often, unmet demands for LDC contract carriage service provoke
bypass." If an LDC is unwilling to provide its own "unbundled"
contract carriage service to match the service provided by the
interstate pipeline, or if such service is not competitively priced,
end-users will have incentives to bypass both the merchant and
transport functions of the LDC. The distinction between comp!ete
and partial bypass is important. As this Article argues more fully
below,28 the situations in which the social interest lies in constrain-
ing entry arise primarily in connection with attempts to bypass
the transport function in ways that lead to wastefully duplicative
physical investments.
Order 436. eases restrictions on a pipeline company's ability to
enter downstream end-use markets by building new facilities and
selling either pipeline-owned gas or pipeline contract carriage
transportation services directly to end-users."' It eliminates the
need to gain approval for entry through the traditional and
lengthy process of applying for a certificate of convenience and
necessity under Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (the
24. See, e.g., Blaydon, supra note 14, at 167.
25. See, e.g., J. KALT., TI E REDESIGN OF RATE STRUCrURES AND CAPACITY AUcrIONING IN TIE
NATURLA GAs PIPELI.NE INDUSRv 12-19 (Energy and Environmental Policy Center, Harvard
University, Discussion Paper Series No. E-88-04, 1988).
26. See Mojave Pipeline Co., 35 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61.199, at
61,459, 61,466 (May 19, 1986) (Docket Nos. CP85-437 et al.) (order consolidating
proceedings for comparative hearing) [hereinafter Mojave Pipeline].
27. See INTERSTATE NATURAL GAs Ass'N OF Am., THE INTF.EAL4Y OF FEDERAL AND CONSUMING
STArE REGUlATIONS (Research Report 86-3, 1986) [hereinafter INGAA]. Of course, the
relevant decisions regarding rates and other terms of LDC service do not rest solely with
the utilities. Such matters are also under the purview of the PUCs. These state agencies
have their own agendas and objectives that may or may not accord with the LDC's. For a
general discussion of the role of PUCs, see 2 A. KAHN, ThIE ECONOMICs OF RGUL4TXON 10-11
(1971). See also Lambert, Bypass in the Natural Gas Industry, PuB. UTiL. FORT., Apr. 3,
1986, at 11.
28. See infra Part Ill.
29. FERC Order No. 436, supra note 10, at 42,467-76.
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NGA). ° A company that agrees to operate as a nondiscriminatory
contract carrier can now receive expedited and pre-approved
authorization of entry. In return, it must bear all the risk of cost
recovery from the new investments."' This expedited entry permits
pipeline companies to seize rapidly and aggressively market
opportunities as they arise.
Notwithstanding the incentives toward bypass that Order 436
generates, some of its provisions act as disincentives to bypass.
Under Order 436, an LDC may reduce its firm contract demand
for pipelines' gas or firm transport demand for pipelines' capacity
to zero over a period of five years. 2 Alternatively, the LDC can
convert its firm contract demand to firm transport demand, also
over a five-year period."3 In either case, these provisions give
LDCs the ability to reduce their gas costs, thereby discouraging
bypass investment."4
In June of 1987, in Associated Gas Distributors v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission," the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia remanded portions of Order 436 to FERC.
However, the court approved the central goal of the Order: to
open natural gas markets to greater competition by changing the
nature of pipeline regulation. As a result, the court affirmed both
the open access carriage and expedited entry provisions of Order
436.s6
Order 500 is FERC's response to the court's remand.
Although Order 500 leaves the basic thrust of Order 436 intact,
it affects the terms under which LDCs can alter their contractual
relationships with pipelines. 8 In Associated Gas, the court had
ruled that there was no legal basis for allowing LDCs to reduce
30. Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch. 556, § 7, 52 Stat. 821, 824-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 717 (1982)).
31. FERC Order No. 436, supra note 10, at 42,467.
32. Id. at 42,425-26, 42,438-47.
33. Id. Contract demand is the maximum amount of gas supplies (as opposed to
transport capacity) that a pipeline is obligated to provide to a customer.
34. This ability is contingent upon the LDC's pipeline volunteering to be nondiscrimi-
natory contract carriers. Because these reductions and conversions of contract demand and
transport capacity amount to a form of pipeline bypass, pipeline companies have a
disincentive to apply for nondiscriminatory contract carrier status. Indeed, they may prefer
to attempt to bypass the LDC in concert with end-users.
35. 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1468 (1988).
36. 824 F.2d at 1044. See also Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, FERC Order No. 436-A, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,217 (1985) (to be codified
at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 157, 284, 375).
37. FERC Order No. 500, supra note 10.
38. Id. at 30,347-48.
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their firm contract demand or firm transport demand unless
pipelines were relieved of their corresponding city gate service
obligations and their wellhead take-or-pay liabilities.3 9 Thus, Order
500 retains the Order 436 conversion provision and eliminates the
reduction provision. 0 Inasmuch as this modification limits LDCs'
abilities to bargain with relatively costly pipeline-suppliers, the
prospects for bypass are increased.4  Moreover, Order 500
authorizes pipelines to devise inventory charges for customers to
provide for a type of cost-sharing scheme that mitigates pipelines'
exposure to take-or-pay liabilities. 2 Again, all other things equal,
this creates greater pressure for end-users to bypass their LDCs.
There is little doubt that FERC wants the market, rather than
regulation, to govern gas sales and investments. As FERC
promotes this objective in downstream markets, however, conflicts
between federal and state regulators arise. When interstate
pipelines can bypass LDCs and deal directly with gas customers,
they challenge the scope of state PUC regulation. FERC has
articulated its views on the impact of bypass on state-federal
relations in Order 436 and Order 500. For example, Order 436
states that unless "pipelines engage in unfair competitive practices
or other circumstances are present that would make it unfair for
a pipeline to bypass the distributor," "[t]he Commission will not
insulate the LDG markets from the competitive incentives that are
the foundation of the final rule."4 This implies that if there are
effects at the local level from FERC actions that create pressures
on state policies, it is the PUCs' responsibility to devise policies
that minimize or eliminate them. In the case of bypass, this can
mean adjustments such as improved LDC rate design or the
unbundling of LDC transportation.
The direct competition between pipelines and LDCs that bypass
causes raises complicated questions of state and federal rights.
From the states' perspective, bypass threatens the presumed
39. 824 F.2d at 1021-30. A "take-or-pay" provision is a typical component of a
wellhead contract between natural gas producers and a pipeline. Together with the
contract's price provisions, it specifies the minimum payment that must be made to the
producer by requiring that the pipeline pay for a certain quantity of gas, regardless of
whether delivery is actually taken.
40. FERC Order No. 500, supra note 10, at 30,347-48.
41. An LDC could still combat bypass by making transportation services available and
by securing cheaper gas supplies. Alternatively, an LDC can now also unbundle and offer
contract carriage service and face a bypass threat only if.pipelines not serving the LDC can
build spurs to its customers and offer gas that is sufficiently less expensive to compensate
for the new investment costs.
42. FERC Order No. 500, supra note 10, at 30,355.
43. FERC Order No. 436, supra note 10, at 42,468.
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exclusivity of LDC service franchises. Even more fundamental,
states may see bypass as a threat to their abilities to implement
economic and social policy through gas utility rates and policies."
The argument supporting federal jurisdiction over bypass stresses
that neither the shareholders of affected industrial gas users nor
the ultimate buyers of such users' products reside entirely, or
even predominantly, within the state where the gas is used.
Accordingly, only federal authorities can take account of an
appropriately broad range of interests when formulating policy.
II. Recent Actions Affecting Bypass Policy
The tensions over appropriate bypass policy have been
highlighted recently by specific activities of various PUCs and
state legislatures, as well as by suits filed in the federal courts
and before FERC. Although systematic data on these activities
are not available from one central source or collected in a
uniform manner, enough information can be obtained to put
together a rough profile of recent legislative, judicial, and
administrative actions. This Part outlines that profile.
A. Bypass Policy-Making by PUCs
According to a recent survey by the Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America (INGAA) of twenty-two PUCs that regulate
firms comprising 84% of the national gas market, ten had
addressed proposals for bypass between 1981 and 1985.05 The
INGAA survey indicated the degree to which PUCs believe that
they have the legal authority to approve or to reject bypass
proposals. Whereas two of the PUCs surveyed, regulating 11% of
the market, asserted that they had such authority, eighteen, or
62% of the market, claimed their authority on bypass is legally
untested and hence uncertain. Only two PUCs, or 11% of the
market, stated that they do not possess the authority to rule on
bypass.46
Different PUCs have adopted different roles in court and FERC
cases dealing with bypass. Some have taken an activist posture,
44. See, e.g., Mojave Pipeline, supra note 26, at 61,460 (discussing motion of
California PUC to dismiss Mojave application).
45. INGAA, supra note 27, at 10.
46. Id. at 11.
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usually in opposition to bypass;47 others have been passive, letting
the LDC and aligned parties sue the prospective bypassing
customer and supplier on their own. With respect to their own
regulatory policies, certain PUCs have responded to prospective
bypass by encouraging LDCs to offer contract carriage service as
a method of preempting new competition. 8
B. The Role of State Legislatures
State legislatures also have begun to play significant roles in
determining the environment in which bypass incentives operate.
For example, Indiana recently passed legislation that grants its
PUC the authority to approve or to deny bypass investment."
Other legislatures passed similar statutes many years ago."1
Another way in which legislatures have affected bypass policy
is by enacting statutes that subject direct transactions between
interstate pipelines and industrial customers to the certification
process and rate regulation administered by the PUC. This
legislation transforms federally-regulated direct connection
interstate pipelines into state-regulated public utilities. By the
beginning of 1986, only ten states had passed this type of
legislation.5" Thus, in most states, bypass facilities are not consid-
47. See, e.g., Mojave Pipeline, supra note 26, at 61,460.
48. See ANR Pipeline Co., 34 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,238 (Feb.
20, 1986) (Docket Nos. CP84-386 et al.) (order setting case for hearing) [hereinafter ANR
Pipeline I]. See also infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
49. A survey of 44 PUCs by the Missouri Public Service Commission indicates that
LDCs in nine states do not transport gas on a contract carriage basis. For the 35 PUCs
indicating that contract carriage does take place in their states, the survey results suggest
that the conditions under which such service is offered vary considerably from state to state.
For example, only ten of the surveyed PUCs have instituted a program of mandatory LDC
contract carriage, California's unfolding program being the most far-reaching. In the 25
other states, LDCs have discretion whether to offer access to LDC contract carriage. See
PuB. SERv. COMm'N OF Missouki, TUIE INSrIGATION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN TILE TRANSPORTATION OF
NATutAL GAs AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO TILE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAs CoRPoRATiONS IN MISSOUI
Section VI (1986). Independent of whether or not access to LDC contract carriage is
mandatory or voluntary, however, LDCs may or may not be required to post tariffs for
contract carriage service with their PUCs. Of the 35 states in the Missouri Public Service
Commission survey that have LDC contract carriage, only 24 mandate that associated tariffs
be filed. Id.
50. INo. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-87.5 (Burns 1988). Indiana's law was passed in 1985.
51. See, e.g., Micii. Coup. LAws ANN. § 483.103 (West 1987). The Michigan statute
dates back to 1929. See INGAA, supra note 27, at 10.
52. See INGAA Poll Finds Widespread Implementation of State Carriage Program,
INSiP. F.E.R.C., Dec. 23, 1985, at 9. New York, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Florida have
mandatory transportation. Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Colorado, Indiana, and Ohio have
active voluntary transportation programs.
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ered to be public utilities in statutory terms." Moreover, as is
true in Mississippi,"' some states exempt utilities that serve very
small numbers of customers from PUC regulation.55
State legislatures have also been active in developing statutes
to regulate LDC contract carriage. West Virginia, for example,
recently has enacted enabling legislation that instructs its PUC to
design rules for mandatory contract carriage by LDCs that
operate within the state.56 Under their legislative mandates, PUCs
in states such as New York, Pennsylvania, and California have
already moved to allow their respective LDCs to establish contract
carriage service. 7
C. Actions by the Judicial System Affecting Bypass Policy
Because of the conflict over jurisdiction and resource allocation
that bypass engenders, it is not surprising that litigation also is
shaping bypass policy. Aside from Associated Gas,5" the most
significant case on the bypass issue is the May 1987 settlement of
District of Columbia Hospital Energy Cooperative Inc. v. Wash-
ington Gas Light Co. 9 The plaintiffs were a group of seven
Washington, D.C. hospitals that had arranged for direct dis-
counted spot purchases of gas from Yankee Resources, an
independent supplier based in Ohio. The hospitals sought to have
the local transportation of that gas performed by their LDC,
Washington Gas Light Co. (WGL). When WGL refused to provide
the contract carriage service requested, the hospitals sued WGL.
The essence of the hospitals' allegations was that it was anti-
competitive for WGL to attempt to extend a franchise monopoly
in the transmission and distribution of gas into an unsanctioned
monopoly in the purchase and sale of gas to end-users. Whether
the hospitals ultimately would have sought complete bypass of
53. PUCs can assert that their jurisdiction covers direct sales made locally by an
interstate pipeline, but these assertions inevitably must meet with the approval of the
legislature and the courts. For a sampling of PUC decisions in this regard, see Burkhart,
Gas System Bypass: Can States Regulate Direct Sales by Interstate Pipelines?, PuB. UTn..
FORT., July 9, 1987. at 45.
54. Miss. CODE ANN. § 77-11-307 (1988 Supp.).
55. See INGAA. supra note 27, at 10.
56. W. VA. Couz § 24-1-2 (1986); see also United Fuel Gas Co. v. Battle, 153 W.Va.
222. 167 S.E. 2d 890 (W.Va. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 116 (1969).
57. Lambert, supra note 27, at 16.
58. Associated Gas Distribs. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 824 F.2d 981
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. CL 1468 (1988).
59. No. 85-3720 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 20, 1985).
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WGL's system is not known. In any event, under the terms of the
settlement, WGL agreed to seek regulatory approval from the
District of Columbia Public Service Commission to carry out
contract carriage service for gas customers within the District of
"olumbia. WGL filed its contract carriage tariff in June 1987.0
The Role of FERC in Shaping Bypass Policy
Several bypass cases before FERC are having a profound effect
on the nature of bypass policy. Two of the more important cases
were settled before FERC reached a final decision. One such case
involved a Columbia Nitrogen fertilizer plant in Georgia that
sought to bypass its LDC, Atlanta Gas Light Company (Atlanta
Gas)." The proposed bypass would have entailed building a spur
line of less than one mile in length to connect the Southern
Natural Gas Pipeline Company (Southern Natural) to the fertilizer
plant. Columbia Nitrogen estimated that at the rates that Atlanta
Gas was charging, it would have been able to save approximately
$3 million annually through the bypass investment. Atlanta Gas
argued that because it was Southern Natural's largest customer
and Columbia Nitrogen was in turn Atlanta Gas' largest customer,
the "loss of load" engendered by the bypass (approximately
70,000 million BTU per day of interruptible sales) would have
increased its overall average gas costs and imposed a larger
portion of its fixed costs upon residential and small commercial
customers. Atlanta Gas was joined in opposing Southern Natural's
application before FERC by other customers of Southern Natural,
the Consumers' Utility Counsel of Georgia, and most important,
the Georgia Public Service Commission (the GPSC). Before FERC
was able to reach a decision, the GPSC instituted rules allowing
Atlanta Gas to offer both contract carriage service and market
sensitive rates to industrial end-users. Upon the appearance of the
improved service offering and lower tariffs, Columbia Nitrogen
withdrew its bypass proposal.
60. While the case focused on the hospitals' desire for contract carriage access to
WGL's system, the hospitals recently appealed the rates that WGL filed for such service,
alleging that they are set too high. See Chandler, Bargain-Price Natural Gas Flowing to
Area Hospitals, Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1987, at D9, col. 5.
61. Southern Natural Gas Co., FERC Docket No. CP85-529 (1985) (application
withdrawn prior to official action) [hereinafter Southern Natural]. See Fertilizer Plant Would
Bypass Distributor Under Southern Natural Deal, INSIDE F.E.R.C., May 27, 1985, at 1;
Southern Natural Customers, State Regulators Fight Bypass, INSIDE F.E.R.C., July 15, 1985,
at 6.
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A similar FERC case involved Bethlehem Steel Corporation's
(Bethlehem) plant in Burns Harbor, Indiana and the LDC serving
that plant, the Northern Indiana Public Service Company
(NIPSCO). 62 Bethlehem had proposed to build a short pipeline to
connect its Burns Harbor plant directly to the ANR Pipeline
Company (ANR), one of the trunk lines from which NIPSCO
purchases its gas."' Bethlehem alleged that access to alternative
supplies for its interruptible demand would allow it to lower its
costs." While Bethlehem would have used the bypass spur with
ANR to fulfill its interruptible requirements, Bethlehem still would
have relied on NIPSCO for its firm demands.6 Thus, Bethlehem
was proposing only a partial bypass of NIPSCO's system. NIPSCO
alleged that the Bethlehem-ANR bypass would shift significant
costs to NIPSCO's residential and small commercial customers. 6
Bethlehem argued before FERC that NIPSCO's rates were inap-
propriately "inverted," with interruptible rates exceeding those for
higher quality firm service. 7 Ultimately, Bethlehem and ANR
withdrew their proposal in return for a significant adjustment of
NIPSCO's rates for interruptible sales to Bethlehem. 8
The most important FERC adjudication on bypass to date is
FERC's recent decision on a case involving Panhandle Eastern
Pipeline Company (Panhandle), National Steel Corporation
(National Steel), and Michigan Consolidated Gas Company
(MichCon). 61 National Steel arranged for direct purchases of gas
supplies in Oklahoma from Union Texas Corporation at facilities
that are connected to Panhandle's system." National Steel argued
that at MichCon's current rates, it could realize significant cost
savings if it bypassed MichCon." National Steel, however, stated
that if MichCon lowered its rates it would regain the opportunity
62. ANR Pipeline I, supra note 48. Both authors served as consultants to Bethlehem
Steel Corporation for this case.
63. Id. at 61,409-10.
64. Id. at 61,411.
65. Id. at 61,409, 61,411.
66. Id. at 61,410.
67. Id. at 61,411.
68. ANR Pipeline Co., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 65,031 (Apr. 15,
1987) (Docket Nos. CP84-386 et al.) (initial decision dismissing proceeding without
prejudice), affd, 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,205 (May 26, 1987).
69. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 38 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
63,009 Uan. 22, 1987) (Docket Nos. CP86-232 et al.) (initial decision) [hereinafter Panhandle
I].
70. Id. at 65,034.
71. Id. at 65.034.
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to supply National Steel." Moreover, National Steel asserted that
the plant would further diversify its supply options with other
fuels even if the proposed bypass was approved." MichCon
argued that Panhandle was proposing to charge discriminatory
rates for its transportation service that made competition with the
bypass virtually impossible." MichCon further contended that the
loss of National Steel as its customer would lead to a reduction
of about $10 million in annual revenues." The costs covered by
these revenues necessarily would have to be spread among
MichCon's remaining customers."
Despite MichCon's arguments, FERC decided against MichCon
and affirmed the administrative law judge's decision to grant
Panhandle and National Steel their application for the bypass."
The first decision had noted, in part, that "the potential detri-
ments to MichCon and its customers will occur regardless of
whether the application ... is granted because National Steel has
a viable other supply option,"" and that "any potential detriment
to MichCon's other customers from granting the application . . .
is speculative since MichCon would not file for a rate increase
with the Michigan Public Service Commission solely because of
the loss of National Steel's load."79 Thus, it was FERC's judgement
that because National Steel had alternate supply arrangements
available, it already had effectively bypassed MichCon.80 In
addition, because MichCon did not intend to seek an increase in
its rates if the National Steel bypass were approved, FERC
concluded that any resulting losses would not have to be made
up through higher rates for the remaining customers."'
The most hotly contested bypass case to date is currently
before FERC.8" The Mojave case involves the applications of two
72. Id. at 65,036.
73. Id. at 65,035.
74. Id. at 65,038, 65,039.
75. Id. at 65,038.
76. Id. at 65,038.
77. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 40 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 1
61,220 (Sept. 10, 1987) (Opinion No. 275-A. Docket Nos. CP86-232 et al.) [hereinafter
Panhandle II].
78. Panhandle I, supra note 69, at 65,076.
79. Id.
80. Panhandle II, supra note 77, at 61,752.
81. Id. at 61,752, affirming Panhandle I, supra note 69, at 65,076.
82. Mojave Pipeline, supra note 26. See also Mojave Application is 'Subterfuge' to
Evade Jurisdiction, CPUC Charges, INsIDE F.E.R.C., July 1, 1985, at 10; CPUC Can't Meet
Hinshaw Test in Jurisdictional Dispute, Mojave Says, INSIDE F.E.R.C., July 15, 1985, at 8.
Dr. Kalt is serving as a consultant in the Mojave case.
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interstate pipeline companies, Mojave and Kern River, to serve
directly enhanced oil recovery (EOR)s3 gas customers in central
California. The proposed systems would allow EOR customers to
bypass the intrastate distribution facilities of Pacific Gas and
Electric (PG&E) and Southern California Gas (SoCal). s4 The bypass
applications are a response to EOR producers' complaints that
they have been disfavored customers in California, receiving low-
quality yet expensive service from PG&E and SoCal.85 The
California Public Utility Commission (the CPUC)-a party to the
case in opposition to the bypass-has responded by implementing
new rules designed to improve opportunities for service and to
rationalize rates for the EOR gas market. The CPUC, PG&E, and
SoCal argue that approval of the bypass will in turn impose a
greater share of the utilities' fixed costs upon the remaining
customers and result in duplication of facilities."' The EOR
producers contend that if the threat of bypass were removed,
they would again be subject to the market power of the LDC
and the political objectives of the CPUC. The producers also
argue that competition will block the actual construction of new
facilities if they are wastefully duplicative.
The Mojave case will have a major effect on the future of
bypass policy if for no other reason than the size of the market
at issue and the number of parties involved. One of the case's
more interesting characteristics is the fact that the EOR pro-
ducers' position suggests that they find the political risks of
conducting business with competing pipelines regulated by
competing levels of government more palatable than the political
risks of conducting business with LDCs regulated by the Califor-
nia state government alone. That may well be a harbinger of
future bypass proposals.
E. Bypass Policy Lessons Learned from the Legal Battles
The recent litigation over bypass illustrates the major themes
around which cogent assessments of relevant public policy should
be structured. The public clearly has an interest in avoiding
83. "Enhanced oil recovery" refers to a process in which steam or other agents are
applied to the drilling procedure to increase the amount of petroleum obtained from a
given deposit. Mojave Pipeline, supra note 26, at 61,458.
84. Id. at 61,459, 61,460.
85. Id. at 61.466.
86. Id. at 61,459-61.
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wasteful use of scarce resources, and if bypass facilities merely
duplicate services already available from state-regulated LDCs,
they are wasteful. Yet, public policy with respect to bypass does
not determine whether bypass facilities are built or not; it only
determines whether market entrants are able to compete for the
chance to provide their services. As the cases mentioned above
show, the mere prospect of new entry can engender improve-
ments in LDC rates and services that out-compete a proposed
bypass and therefore eliminate the need for building bypass
facilities.
The foregoing cases highlight the equity issues that bypass
policy raises. Industrial gas users stand to benefit the most from
allowing the possibility of bypass while LDCs and their non-
bypassing customers find the competition introduced when bypass
is permitted threatening. This split is mirrored in the federal-state
tensions over bypass policy, with state regulators particularly
sensitive to in-state, residential consumers' interests and the
federal authorities seeing a broader, national set of gas users.
Assertions in the political arena, or even in the courts, rarely
provide guidance for policymakers to use in the face of such
conflicts. Accordingly, a systematic framework for analyzing the
costs, benefits, and probability of consummated bypass should be
developed.
III. Bypass and the Theory of Entry Regulation
Up to this point it has been necessary to define only loosely
what is meant by bypass. However, a more formal definition is
needed to develop an analytical framework of the economic
determinants and the costs and benefits of bypass. A customer
bypasses a regulated utility when it discontinues the purchase of
a service or product from the utility and instead: (1) buys the
service or product from a utility in another service area (horizon-
tal competition); (2) buys the service or product from a party
upstream from the utility (vertical competition); (3) produces the
service or product itself through, for example, internal production
of synthetic natural gas or electrical cogeneration (vertical
integration); or (4) buys a service or product that is a close
substitute for that provided by the utility. An example of this
final form of bypass is the use of dual-fired boilers or other
means of fuel switching.
The central economic implications of bypass can be segregated
along familiar efficiency and equity lines. Within the context of
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regulatory practices that traditionally have protected exclusive
territorial franchises from the threat of entry, a crucial question
of regulatory efficiency is presented: when is an incumbent utility
susceptible to inefficient entry? Inefficient bypass may be defined
as entry that engenders social costs in excess of social benefits.
Addressing the efficiency of bypass raises other questions as well.
How can competition exist in a market presumed to be a natural
monopoly? If a regulated utility and competitors can co-exist, is
the granting of an exclusive franchise to the utility warranted?
Should the utility continue to be subject to a legal obligation to
serve all customers in its service area if it is open to the threat
of entry by new competition? And, on what basis should entry be
regulated?
From an equity standpoint, if PUCs follow a de facto policy of
guaranteeing gas utilities' fixed cost recovery, bypass can engen-
der redistributions of the burden of fixed costs. In these circum-
stances, it is unlikely that bypass will ever be unanimously
welcomed. This most certainly does not mean that bypass is
necessarily a zero-sum or negative-sum event, but it does
underscore the political tensions that have been mentioned
previously. The purpose of this and the following Part is to
examine the susceptibility of gas distribution markets to entry and
to analyze the types of costs and benefits that come with bypass.
A. The Economics of Entry Regulation
Against a backdrop of perceived sizeable reductions in eco-
nomic welfare and growing administrative burdens resulting from
the regulation of a variety of industries, economists have been
turning their attention toward re-examining the conditions under
which government involvement in the marketplace is socially
beneficial. This process has reaffirmed the importance of the
conditions of entry in affecting the ability of a market to perform
efficiently. This principal has been formalized in the theory of
contestability.87
A monopolistic or oligopolistic market is contestable when the
threat of entry is sufficient to maintain the price and output
levels that would occur if the market were competitively struc-
87. See W. BAUMOL, J. PANz.it & R. WUILG, CovTmnLE MARKs AND THE TnEORY oF
INDUYItY SrRUCrUEF. (1982); Shepherd, Contestability Versus Competition, 74 AM. ECON. Rv.
572 (1984).
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tured. In general, three conditions must prevail for a market to
be contestable. First, entry into and exit from the market must
require the expenditure of few or no sunk costs. Second, all
potential entrants must have access to the technology employed
by the incumbent firms. Finally, the incumbent firm must not be
able to adjust prices instantaneously when faced with the threat
of entry. When these conditions exist, hit and run entry and exit
are possible. This threat will cause even a firm in a monopolistic
market to set its price and output at the competitive equilibrium
because the ability of entrants to attack targets of profitability
quickly provides discipline on incumbents' pricing and service
offerings.8
The efficacy of contestability as a threat hinges centrally on
the mobility of capital. Clearly, the natural gas distribution
industry is not characterized by highly mobile, quickly deployed
and redeployed capital. This characteristic of the industry belies
the possibility of hit and run entry and renders reliance on
contestability to control monopolistic pricing futile."9 As a result,
under conditions in which distribution markets are not (or cannot
be made) structurally competitive, there is a rationale for public
utility-style price regulation. The question then arises whether
entry into such markets should also be regulated.
Notwithstanding a general recognition of the benefits of easy
entry, the answer to the foregoing question must be informed by
the possibility that an industry that is most efficiently structured
as a monopoly or oligopoly might not be able to sustain that
structure if entry is unregulated. For example, if one large LDC
or pipeline can serve a given market more cheaply than some
multiple number of firms, entry by multiple firms would consti-
tute a wasteful duplication of facilities. Whether a policy of
unregulated entry would lead to such a result depends upon the
rates that the incumbent can charge and the services that it can
provide. In particular, if potential entrants anticipate that rates
after entry will be insufficient to allow them to cover their costs,
entry will be deterred and the incumbent's natural monopoly will
be sustainable.90
88. See Bailey & Baumol, supra note 1, at 120.
89. Similar conditions prevail in the pipeline segment of the industry. See Broadman
& Toman, Non-Price Provisions in Long-Term Natural Gas Contracts, 62 LAN EcoN. 111,
112 (1986).
90. The genesis of the "sustainability" literature is Pan7ar & Willig, Free Entry and
the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly, 8 BF.m. J. EcoN. 1 (1977).
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A central determinant of the sustainability of a market that is
naturally and efficiently structured as a monopoly is the market's
contestability. In fact, while contestability provides a justification
for laissez faire in markets that are not naturally monopolistic, the
tables are turned in markets where efficiency requires a single
firm."' If an entrant's capital is highly mobile and not sunk upon
entry, new competitors can engage in hit and run entry into the
incumbent's market (or some of its submarkets) whenever the
incumbent loads fixed costs into rates such that those rates exceed
an entrant's costs. This could leave the incumbent with no set of
rates that allows it to recover its costs and deter entry. When hit
and run entry is possible, there can be an efficiency justification
for restricting freedom of entry into otherwise naturally monopo-
listic or oligopolistic markets.
Notwithstanding their theoretical appeal, arguments for
restrictions on entry into contestable natural monopoly markets
have no obvious applicability to questions of bypass in natural gas
distribution markets. Hit and run entry is wholly unrealistic in
such markets because entrants must sink fixed costs to operate in
the market. Because of the need to make distribution investments
that cannot be pulled up freely and redeployed elsewhere, a new
entrant can anticipate finding itself stuck in an industry already
populated by an established competitor. As a result, the entrant's
post-entry rates may yield losses. Losses are even more likely to
occur if the established incumbent is a natural monopolist and
therefore more efficient by definition. The sunk costs of distribu-
tion act as a barrier to entry and enhance the sustainability of
incumbent companies' market positions.
A new entrant might be willing to get stuck in head-to-head
competition with an incumbent utility if the utility has little or
no ability to respond with better service offerings or rates of its
own. In fact, natural gas utilities typically have the ability to
respond to the prospect of entry with so-called "Mickey Mouse,"
multi-part rates.92 Rates charged by distribution companies and
91. "Where markets are perfectly contestable and monopoly is natural but
unsustainable, limitations upon entry may be needed to ensure that the socially optimal set
of products can be produced in the most efficient manner." W. BAUMOL, J. PANzAR & R.
Wn.IG, supra note 87, at 222-23. In short, while contestability is a necessary condition for
the deregulation of entry to maximize economic efficiency, it is not sufficient. Sufficiency
requires that the market in question be not only contestable, but also sustainable.
92. See Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly,
85 Q.J. EcON. 77 (1971).
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pipeline companies commonly can be stated in two parts: a
commodity charge and a demand charge. The commodity charge
varies with the volume of gas actually provided and generally
covers at least variable costs. The demand charge bills customers
for access to service without regard to the volume of gas
purchased. Thus, this charge provides for recovery of some of the
fixed costs. Such rate designs can enable even a natural monopo-
list facing contestability to sustain itself and deter entry." This
conclusion is most true in industrial gas markets, where small
numbers of sophisticated parties can meet to negotiate and tailor
rates to specific contexts. Higher transactions costs and less
sophisticated buyers make this outcome less feasible in residential
and small-scale commercial markets. However, these latter markets
have not been the targets of bypass.
In sum, the sunk costs of incumbent LDCs deter, rather than
encourage, bypass entry. Moreover, the ability of LDCs to
respond to the threat of bypass by improving rates and services
permits them to sustain themselves in the face of otherwise
wasteful entry. Clearly, the long-standing tradition of granting
LDCs an exclusive franchise, which obligates them to serve all
customers in a market but also protects them from competitive
entry, can be interpreted as being based on the notion that LDC
markets are not sustainable. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to
conclude that sustaining otherwise naturally monopolistic struc-
tures in local gas distribution markets does not require draconian
prohibitions on entry.
B. Linkages Between Entry Regulation and Rate Regulation
The feasibility of bypass and the sustainability of LDCs'
monopolies are tied directly to the rate structures in the gas
industry." The current demand charge-commodity charge rate
structure should be taken to its logical limits to permit an
improved rate design. 5 A rate design that allows for more
efficient signalling of costs and demands will eliminate the
consideration of fixed costs from LDCs' charges for marginal gas
and transportation service. Moreover, the allocation of the various
93. See, e.g., Perry, Sustainable Positive Profit, Multiple Price Strategies in Contestable
Markets, 32 J. EcoN. TneoiY 246 (1984).
94.. See, e.g.. Offior OF PIPEUNE AND PRoDUCER ReGUiA'ION AND OfficE Or FAONOMIC POuCY,
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COM.w'N, GAS TRANSPORTATION RA-r DESIGN AND TIHE USE OF AUcTIONS
To Ai.c ~CT CAFAcrrv 30-31 (1987) (on file with authors) [hereinafter RArE DESIGN].
95. See J. KALT, supra note 25, at 30.
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classes and priorities of service, such as firm and interruptible
demand, on the basis of price rather than politically-determined
criteria of preference would permit improved distributions of
these services.9 6 Movement in this direction will require new
approaches and contractual institutions. These include inventory
fees, which charge for customers' use of LDC storage facilities and
gas inventories; exit fees, which charge for leaving LDC systems;
and reservation fees, which charge for the right to call on LDC
services. Other needed reforms include the increased availability
of fully unbundled transportation and sales services and the
introduction of more market-based allocations of access to LDC
facilities of the kind contemplated at the federal level in FERC's
recent auction proposal for reservation rights on interstate
pipelines."7
The observation that a naturally monopolistic LDC can
effectively deter entry with appropriate rate designs provides, by
reverse implication, insight into the origins of customers' interests
in bypass. Specifically, inappropriate LDC rate designs or the
inability to provide customers with the services that they demand
are the underlying roots of bypass. As commonly phrased by
LDCs and their respective PUCs, the difficulty of rate design lies
in allocating fixed costs from jointly used facilities across customer
classes and types of service.9" Local gas distribution markets are
not made up of a single, homogeneous class of customers. They
include residential, commercial, and industrial gas users, each of
whom commonly has different demand characteristics and desires
different types or qualities of service. In addition, customers
commonly differ in their needs for such attributes of LDC
operations as gas brokerage services, storage services, and price
and contract term reliability.9 LDCs with economies of scope can
attempt to serve these various needs from a single physical plant,
allowing customers to share the use of at least some LDC
facilities."'0
96. Id. at 31.
97. RAr DrSIGN, supra note 94.
98. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussion of LDC and PUC
responses to bypass).
99. These demands underlie the bypass cases reviewed supra notes 58-86 and
accompanying text.
100. Economies of scope arise when the total cost of producing (or delivering) two
or more products (or services) jointly is less than the sum of producing (or delivering) each
separately. For more discussion, see Bailey & Baumol, supra note 1, at 118.
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The allocation of the costs of jointly used facilities across LDCs'
rates presents both economic and political problems. To be sure,
it is relatively easy for economists to describe and advocate first-
best multi-part rate structures"' or second-best "Ramsey" prices,"'2
which load fixed costs into prices in inverse proportion to the
elasticity of customer demand. Nevertheless, it must be stressed
that LDCs and PUCs do not make rates in an environment where
economic efficiency is the sole objective of the parties involved.
Most often, the parties to the ratemaking process-including LDC
management, PUC commissioners and staff, involved politicians,
and the various classes of customers-have conflicting private and
social concerns over the burden of cost recovery.
As the discussion of recent cases suggests,' the LDC rate-
making process easily can result in rate designs and correspond-
ing allocations of types of service that lead to proposals for LDC
bypass. To the extent that an LDC's service offerings leave certain
customers' demands unmet, affected customers will have incentives
to pursue bypass. Similarly, to the extent that the politics of
ratemaking impose burdens that exceed the costs of bypass on
particular customer classes, those classes have an incentive to
pursue bypass. Even second-best Ramsey pricing may not be
sustainable in the face of entry.' However, Ramsey pricing
generally is not practiced by PUCs, and its sustainability is largely
irrelevant in debates over bypass. The ultimate lesson is that the
prospect of bypass pressures PUCs to institute more rational first-
best pricing policies.0 5
The fact that some bypass proposals can arise because of
untoward aspects of state regulatory processes does not mean that
such proposals are somehow economically unjustified. Improved
costs or quality of service for customers of a bypass constitute real
economic benefits. However, the fact that a prospective or actual
instance of bypass can impinge on state regulatory processes and
lead PUCs to design different rate or service offerings does
101. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
102. Ramsey pricing refers to the scheme developed in Ramsey, A Contribution to the
Theory of Taxation, 37 EcoN. J. 47 (1927). The most comprehensive restatement is in
Baumol & Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 Am. ECoN. Rv.
265 (1970). Advocacy for defense of such second-best rate designs against bypass is
contained in MacAvoy, Spulber & Stangle, Is Competitive Entry Free? Bypass and Partial
Deregulation in Natural Gas Markets, 6 YALu J. ON REG. 209, 237-40 (1989).
103. See supra notes 58-86 and accompanying text.
104. See MacAvoy, Spulber & Stangle, supra note 102, at 239-40.
105. See, e.g., Bailey & Baumol, supra note 1, at 121-22; Perry, supra note 93.
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suggest that there can be both winners and losers, benefits and
costs from bypass competition.
IV. The Benefits and Costs of LDC Bypass
As a general rule, public policy choices involve some implicit
or explicit comparisons of winners and losers, gains and losses.
Economically efficient policies seek to promote activities in which
the former exceed the latter. The possibility that bypass can
produce both winners and losers means that it is useful to
contrast socially economic bypass with socially uneconomic
bypass. 0 16 In the common case in which the bypasser is an
industrial end-user, the beneficiaries generally include stock-
holders, final consumers of the affected industrial products and,
in some instances, labor."0 7 The parties presumed to be harmed
include LDC stockholders and customers remaining after bypass.
A socially efficient bypass is one in which the gains to the
bypassers exceed the losses to LDC stockholders and remaining
customers. In such a case, regulation of entry is unwarranted and
the prospect of bypass should be allowed. When losses to the
remaining customers exceed the gains to the bypassers, economic
standards of efficiency indicate that the bypass should not occur.
These policy conclusions risk being mischaracterized as policy
choices. Policymakers encounter bypass as a request by a new
competitor for the right to try to enter a market. The policy-
makers' decision does not cause bypass facilities to be built or
force customers to switch suppliers. There is simply a choice
whether to allow the competition to take place. The competition,
in turn, will determine whether entry is successful. In fact, the
policymaker can seldom be expected to have ex ante knowledge
of the full costs and benefits of a particular bypass proposal.
Thus, the policymaker must determine whether competition
between incumbent utilities and potential entrants can be relied
upon to weed out socially uneconomic bypass proposals if a
proposed bypass is allowed to compete to enter the market. This
is the implied policy problem of deregulating entry into gas
distribution markets.
106. For the sake of simplicity let us refer to the presumed beneficiaries of bypass as
the "bypassers".
107. A socially economic bypass can then be said to be one in which the gains to the
bypassers exceed the losses to the remaining customers. The parties presumed to be harmed
directly by bypass can be designated the "remaining customers."
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The question posed by this policy problem involves the
sustainability of the LDC's traditional monopoly (or oligopoly)
position. As was stressed above, the sunk costs of established
utilities act as a barrier to entry; indeed, they act as a barrier to
entry by even efficient bypass. 0 8 When coupled with the PUC-
conferred ability to respond to the threat of competition by
means of rate and service redesigns, efficient utility service can be
expected to be sustainable against the threat of entry.
One implication of allowing the market to decide the fate of
bypass 'proposals is that even if inefficient entry is weeded out,
the competition leading to such a result may alter utilities'
pre-existing rate structures and service offerings t'0 To the extent
that this process rationalizes rate structures in accordance with
marginal cost pricing principles, or the process results in
improved service offerings to potential bypassers, it is not a
zero-sum process. In this instance, competition yields improved
efficiency. In fact, the competition that weeds out uneconomic
bypass need be no worse than zero-sum as long as PUCs and
their utilities do not worsen rate designs by shifting forgone fixed
cost recovery from prospective bypassers into other customers'
rates for incremental service. Stated differently, if the only benefit
to prospective bypassers from bypass competition is a reduction
in contributions to their utility's overhead, the implied burden on
other ratepayers need not exceed an equivalent amount.
A. A Framework for Analyzing the Benefits and Costs of Bypass
From a welfare perspective, the benefits of bypass are the
consumer surplus gains realized by bypassers, while the cost of
bypass and the process of allowing competition over bypass are
the burdens. In this framework, the efficiency test for bypass
amounts to assessing whether the winners' gains from bypass
outweigh the losers' losses.
The losses attributable to bypass can take the form of a
cost-shift from bypassers to remaining ratepayers, but a dollar-for-
dollar cost-shift is not a necessary result of bypass competition.
Any contribution to LDC overhead that is lost from bypassers can
be borne by other ratepayers, utility stockholders, and the utility
itself. In other words, the costs of bypass may take the form of
a cost-shift, a profit-squeeze, or a cost-squeeze. The textbook
108. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 58-86 and accompanying text.
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result of a dollar-for-dollar cost-shift to other ratepayers repre-
sents a limiting, extreme case.' The experience of public utility
regulation suggests that LDCs seldom operate on the knife-edges
of both technical efficiency and zero economic profits."' That is,
there is "fat" that gets squeezed when a political equilibrium is
upset by an event such as bypass. Of course, to the extent that
the result is improved LDC cost efficiency, there are no losers
from the process; there are only pure efficiency gains. When the
burden of bypass falls on other ratepayers and on stockholders,
however, an economic welfare analysis must compare these
parties' losses to the benefits that bypassers realize.
B. The Benefits of Bypass
There are four generic classes of socially productive benefits
that may be attributable to subjecting LDCs to competition from
potential entrants: (1) rate effects," 2 (2) service effects,"' (3) risk
effects," 4 and (4) competitive effects."' Beneficial rate effects result
from the ability of actual or prospective bypass to lower the
marginal expense of delivered gas to bypassing end-users. Any
induced reduction in the expenses that affected end-users pay at
the margin to acquire delivered gas could result in increased gas
use. As long as expenses at the margin are not below the
marginal resource costs of service, this increased use yields net
social benefits. Of course, an LDC could choose to offset such
benefits by responding perversely with higher incremental rates
for remaining customers.
Dissatisfaction with the quality of LDC service can also be an
important impetus to bypass."' Two attributes of service are
110. See supra Part III.
111. See Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the
Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974).
112. These are illustrated by ANR Pipeline I, supra note 48, discussed supra notes
62-68 and accompanying text; and Southern Natural, supra note 61.
113. These are illustrated by the moves toward LDC contract carriage in states such
as California, New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. See Lambert, supra note 27, at
16. See also supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
114. These are illustrated by Mojave Pipeline, supra note 26. discussed supra notes
82-86 and accompanying text.
115. These are illustrated by Panhandle I, supra note 69 and Panhandle II, supra
note 77, discussed supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text; and District of Columbia
Hosp. Energy Coop. Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., No. 85-3720 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 20,
1985). discussed supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
116. See supra Part II.
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frequently at issue. The first is delivery reliability. Low priority
service is a de jure or de facto reality for many industrial
customers of LDCs. The political, if not economic, need to grant
higher priority to other users is frequently manifested, for
example, in the inability of industrial end-users to purchase firm
service from LDCs. This does not mean that LDCs can or should
ignore political necessities in establishing priorities of service.
Rather, it suggests that, in the process of establishing de jure or
de facto priorities, certain customers demands may go unmet. In
such circumstances, bypass may be the only mechanism by which
industrial end-users are able to buy service of the quality that
they desire. The second aspect of service at issue is access to
unbundled LDC transportation service. As federal policy has
moved interstate pipelines into an era of increasingly unbundled,
open-access transportation, many end-users that are sophisticated
enough to take advantage of the implied opportunities have been
blocked from doing so by lack of access to unbundled LDC
transportation." 7 The prospect of bypass can induce LDCs and
their PUGs to respond to these customers' demands, and consum-
mated bypass directly can link them to the nation's emerging
open access transportation grid.
Closely related to the service effects of bypass are the risk
effects. Industrial end-users can not only demand the reliability
of physical deliveries that gives rise to service benefits of bypass;
they can also require reliability in the contractual terms and
conditions of gas delivery service. If de jure or de facto low
priority before PUGs manifests itself in relatively high risks of
changes in the terms and conditions under which LDC service is
available, industrial end-users' costs can be raised (as they
self-insure), 8 long-term planning can be inhibited, and invest-
ment can be discouraged. State PUCs have a difficult time
binding themselves to credible bargains of the type that some
industrial gas users demand. This problem appears to have been
magnified in recent years."' 9 Bypass or the threat of bypass can
provide an answer. Prospective bypass may induce LDCs, and
especially their respective PUCs, to improve the reliability of the
terms and conditions under which local distribution services are
provided. When bypass actually takes place, it commonly involves
117. See supra Part II.
118. For example, firms can self-insure through fuel switching installations.
119. See Kalt, Lee & Leonard, Reestablishing the Regulatory Bargain in the Electric
Power Industry, in FmA. REowr OF TuE BOSTON EDITION REViEW PANEL Appendix V (W.
Hogan ed. 1987).
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turning from state-regulated distribution entities to FERC-
regulated pipeline facilities. Although there is no theoretical
necessity that federal jurisdiction provide more reliable terms and
conditions of service, permitting bypass to occur allows end-users
to vote with their feet. At the very least, access to both state and
federally-regulated facilities sets up inter-jurisdiction competition
and establishes a method by which bypassing end-users can hedge
the risks that they face. This form of competition is not inher-
ently wasteful; it allows users to reduce risks while encouraging
investment and lowering the costs of self-insurance.
Apart from allowing improvements in rates, service, and
reliability, bypass can produce generalized competitive benefits.
For example, insofar as prospective bypass induces LDCs to offer
unbundled transportation, or consummated bypass links large
end-users directly to open access interstate systems, additional
competitors are introduced into the market. This not only tends
to dampen any latent upstream monopoly power, but also
effectively offsets structural monopolies in local gas brokerage that
LDCs enjoy. Finally, competition from bypass coupled with
remaining customers' and LDC stockholders' resistance to the
burden of a cost-shift may induce efficient cost reductions for all
LDC operations. '
C. The Costs of Bypass
Bypass is not free. The most significant costs are those
associated with building and operating the bypass facilities them-
selves. Whether or not new physical facilities are economically
duplicative, their use of labor and capital represents a real
resource cost. From a policy perspective, these costs reduce any
benefits bypassers realize. New facilities can be considered
economically duplicative only to the extent that their costs are not
offset by benefits of the kinds that we have described. When the
benefits of a bypass extend beyond simple delivery of gas to
include improved service quality or risk reduction, the observa-
tion of an apparent physical duplication of facilities provides little
insight into the outcome of a social cost-benefit test.
120. A classic discussion of inter-jurisdictional competition is provided by Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. Poi.. EeoN. 416 (1956).
121. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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It is important to note that some degree of physical duplication
of facilities may well be optimal. For example, many gas and
electric utilities maintain capacity reserve margins to insure
against the risk of short-run increases in demand or to provide
needed capacity during maintenance periods. End-users' bypass
investments can function in much the same way. Similarly,
end-users may have dual-fired boilers or other types of fuel-
switching capabilities; to the extent that these facilities are
tantamount to bypass investments, they also can be viewed as
constituting duplications of physical facilities. Nevertheless, such
investments are usually considered socially beneficial insofar as
they result in a more flexible energy-using capital stock.
If the construction of bypass facilities permits an affected LDC
to avoid building, repairing, or maintaining facilities of its own,
the resulting avoided costs appropriately can be thought of as a
benefit of bypass. Equivalently, the net cost of bypass facilities can
be thought of as being less than the gross cost when bypass
displaces investments that an LDC would otherwise have to make.
A consummated bypass displaces the variable costs that an affected
LDC would otherwise incur. This also is a benefit of bypass. Of
course, the savings in LDCs' variable costs are offset by the
variable expenses of operating the bypass facilities. A priori, it is
not possible to say which supply system, LDC or bypass, has the
lowest operating costs. The comparison depends upon such factors
as the relative distances over which the alternative systems travel
and the extent of any technological improvements embodied in
the bypass' newer facilities.
Conclusion
The most critical lesson of this analysis of bypass is that, given
the complexities and uncertainties associated with assessing
whether a particular bypass proposal produces positive net social
benefits, public policy towards bypass should carry a presumption
in favor of competition. Thus, if there is to be a bias in bypass
policy, it should be towards rather than away from bypass. The
question should not be "when is competition excessive?" but
rather "when is regulation necessary?"
The core of the argument for bypass rests upon two themes.
First, entry and the threat of entry have the capacity to discipline
regulated gas distribution markets in socially productive ways.
Bypass and its threat can increase the pressure on local utilities
to hold down their costs, rationalize their rate structures, and
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improve the range and quality of their service offerings. Second,
entry by socially inefficient bypass proposals is unlikely to be
successful. Because LDCs and PUCs can respond to the prospect
of entry with improved rate designs and because LDCs' fixed
costs are largely sunk, significant deterrents to inefficient entry
exist. Particularly in the context where bypass commonly a-
rises-industrial markets populated by relatively small numbers of
sophisticated participants-efficient natural monopoly in local gas
distribution can be expected to be sustainable. Accordingly,
restrictions on entry can be relaxed.
Effective threats of bypass clearly impinge on the rate-making
process for local gas distribution utilities. This has both economic
and political implications. Reforming LDC rate structures so that
they are more in line with basic principles of economic efficiency
not only would be an important step in improving LDC market
performance overall, but it also would reduce artificial incentives
for bypass. Indeed, it is arguable that one of the reasons why
bypass has become such a major policy issue is that PUCs have
not encouraged LDCs to offer flexible and fuel-sensitive rates and
services to industrial end-users. In fact, many PUCs have followed
a regulatory policy of excessively tilting rates, not to mention
service priorities and quality, in favor of residential and small
commercial customers. In part, these policies have grown out of
the politics of LDC regulation. These policies have generated a
belief among PUCs and LDCs that competition in gas markets
stops at the city gate. Yet, if there is one conclusion to be drawn
from recent FERC actions, it is that wellhead competition in the
gas industry reverberates directly downstream from the wellhead
to the city gate and to the burner-tip. As a result, any attempt to
devise an effective bypass policy in downstream markets neces-
sarily must entail significant reform of LDC rate structures.
The analysis presented in this Article should make it clear that
a blanket ban on bypass would be unsound public policy. On the
one hand, with the introduction of more efficient pricing schemes,
the incidence of bypass proposals and the amount of bypass
actually consummated surely will diminish. On the other hand,
opportunities for credible threats of bypass must be preserved, for
the mere threat of bypass enhances the performance of both
LDCs and PUCs. The argument in favor of allowing bypass is not
that bypass itself is desirable. Rather, permitting bypass engenders
positive effects by enhancing competition throughout the natural
gas market.
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